EU Papers

Abstract: This paper compiles alternative estimates of underground economies in twenty five transition countries during the transition decade and finds a disturbing lack of convergence between them, calling into question the reliability of GDP figures
(which in varying degrees now include non-transparent imputations for the “nonobserved economy”) as well as the macro model estimates of the unrecorded economy. A corollary of this finding is that substantive results from many studies
examining the consequences of the radical transition from planned to market economies must be viewed with considerable skepticism. Underground (unobserved, non-observed, unrecorded) economic activities play a major role in transition economies. Evaluations of the success and failure of the transition experience should be based on estimates of total economic activity (TEA) namely, recorded plus unrecorded economic activity. We examine the conceptual and empirical relationships between new National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) methods for obtaining “exhaustive” measures of total economic activity and the two most popular macro-model approaches (electric consumption and currency ratio models) for estimating the size and growth of the unrecorded sector.
Our updated empirical results detailing the size and trajectory of unrecorded activities obtained from different estimation methods reveal a disturbing lack of convergence. Until these important differences are resolved, investigations of the relationship between economic reforms and economic outcomes during the
transition decade must be viewed with considerable caution. Given the shortcomings of conventional macro model estimates of the underground economy and the lack of transparency and consistency of NOE estimates, it is high time that the profession acknowledges how little we really know about underground economies and their causes and consequences.
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Jel Codes: E01, E26, H26, O11, O17, P24
Keywords: Underground, unrecorded, unobserved, non-observed, NOE, hidden, informal, shadow, GDP, national accounts, transition economies.

Abstract: Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency. In particular, private and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.
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Jel Codes: K23, L5, P20
Keywords: control, ownership, oil pipeline, Tobit

Abstract: The mass privatization program in Bulgaria was implemented in 1996-97. Following programs in countries like the Czech Republic, more sophisticated regulatory bodies were put into place to prevent the kind of abuses observed elsewhere. This study finds that Bulgaria avoided some of the extreme problems that manifested themselves in these other countries, but there were still serious problems of dilution. Dilution is similar in both mass privatization firms and nonmass privatization firms. Dilution is associated with positive performance, suggesting that more concentrated ownership has had some benefits. Even after a
number of years have passed, mass privatization firms have performed less well than firms privatized by other means.
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Jel Codes: G3, P3, P5
Keywords: Bulgaria, mass privatization, dilution

Abstract: Are property rights obtained through legally dubious means forever tainted with original sin or can rightholders make their ill-gotten gains legitimate by doing good works? This is a critical question for developing countries (and Russia in particular) where privatization is often opaque and businesspeople may receive property, but remain unwilling to use it productively due to concerns about the vulnerability of their rights to political challenge. Using a survey of 660 businesspeople conducted in Russia in February 2005, I find that the original sin of an illegal privatization is difficult to expunge. Businesspeople, however, can improve the perceived legitimacy of property rights by doing good works, such as investing in the firm and by providing public goods for the region. Finally, managers that provide public goods for their region are more likely to invest in their firms than those who did not. The finding that public goods providers invest at higher rates is at odds with standard economic logic, but fits well with the more political view of property rights developed here. These findings have implications for political economy and contemporary Russia.
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Jel Codes: K11, O17, P14, P16
Keywords: Property Rights, Transition, Rule of Law, Privatization

Abstract: This paper reports the first empirical evidence that fiscal reform efforts in transition countries have positive effects. Using the EBRD BEEPS I and II data, reported in 1999 and 2002, rigorous econometric models are estimated showing that the share of bribes paid to tax collectors is reduced in countries with more extensive fiscal reforms. This effect controls for selection bias in the likelihood that firms are required to make unofficial payments to tax authorities. On the basis of this evidence, we now have some confidence in the success of fiscal reform efforts. In addition, we have insight regarding what forms of fiscal reform may be more successful as the share of revenues generated from direct taxes (both personal and corporate) has an impact on tax bribes.
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Jel Codes: C21, H25, O23, O52
Keywords: Fiscal reform, Bribery, Transition economies, Eastern Europe, Central Asia

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Jel Codes: F31
Keywords: Equilibrium exchange rate; real exchange rate; behavioral equilibrium exchange rate; Czech koruna, transition economies; stock-flow approach; productivity

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Jel Codes: F31, G15, O10
Keywords: target zone, ERM, non-linearity, SETAR

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Jel Codes: C15, E31, F0, F31
Keywords: Purchasing power parity, inflation convergence, developing country, panel unit-root tests allowing structural breaks.

Abstract: Economic development implies that the efficiency of firms in developing countries is approaching that of firms in advanced economies. We examine the extent of this convergence in the Czech Republic and Russia, economies that represent alternative models of implementing development policies, often referred to as the Washington Consensus, that have promoted privatization, competition and foreign investment. We also test hypotheses positing that only firms near the efficiency frontier benefit from these policies and catch up. Using 1992-2000 panel data on virtually all industrial firms in each country, we find that privatization to domestic owners did not markedly improve the efficiency of firms; domestic firms are not catching up to the (world) efficiency standard given by foreign-owned firms; and the distance of the Russian firms to the efficiency frontier is much larger than that of the Czech firms and continued to grow for most firms beyond 1997 while remaining constant in the Czech Republic. Domestic firms closer to the frontier are not more likely to catch up than firms further from the frontier although foreign firms do exhibit this behavior. Foreign-owned firms are increasingly displacing domestic firms in the top deciles of the overall distribution of efficiency, due in part to slower "learning" by domestic firms, higher efficiency of foreign startups, and foreigners' acquisitions of more efficient domestic firms. The two alternative implementations of the Washington Consensus policies have thus not enabled domestic firms to start catching up to the world standard.
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Jel Codes: C33, D20, G32, L20
Keywords: Efficiency, productivity, economic development, foreign direct investment, ownership, convergence, frontier, Czech Republic, Russia, Washington Consensus.

Abstract: This article examines the political conditions shaping the creation of new institutional capabilities. It analyzes bank sector reforms in the 1990s in three leading postcommunist democracies Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. It shows how different political approaches to economic transformation can facilitate or hinder the ability of relevant public and private actors to experiment and learn their new roles. With its emphasis on insulating power and rapidly implementing self-enforcing economic incentives, the "depoliticization: approach creates few changes in bank behavior and, indeed impedes investment in new capabilities at the bank and supervisory levels. The "deliberative restructuring" approach fostered innovative, costeffective monitoring structures for recapitalization, a strong supervisory system, and a stable, expanding banking sector.
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Jel Codes: F02, G28, K23, P26, P48
Keywords: Institutional change, transition economies, bank crises, bank supervision, learning

Abstract: The European Union has recently expanded from 15 to 25 countries. In line with this enlargement, the list of official EU languages has grown from 11 to 20. Currently, the EU extends equal treatment to all member countries? official languages by providing translations for documents and interpreting services for meetings and sessions of the European Parliament. This, however, is costly, especially when recognizing that many Europeans speak one of the procedural languages of the EU, English, French or German, either as their native language or as a foreign language. We compute disenfranchisement rates that would result from using only the three procedural languages for all EU business, and marginal costs per disenfranchised person associated with providing translations and interpreting into the remaining 17 languages. The marginal costs are shown to vary substantially across the different languages, raising important questions about the economic efficiency of equal treatment for all languages. We argue that an efficient solution would be to decentralize the provision of translations.
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Jel Codes: D70, O52, Z13
Keywords: Languages, Disenfranchisement, European Union, Cost and benefit analysis